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Abstract
We present a new English translation of L.E.J. Brouwer’s paper ‘De onbe-
trouwbaarheid der logische principes’ (The unreliability of the logical principles)
of 1908, together with a philosophical and historical introduction. In this paper
Brouwer for the first time objected to the idea that the Principle of the Excluded
Middle is valid. We discuss the circumstances under which the manuscript was
submitted and accepted, Brouwer’s ideas on the principle of the excluded mid-
dle, its consistency and partial validity, and his argument against the possibility
of absolutely undecidable propositions. We note that principled objections to
the general excluded middle similar to Brouwer’s had been advanced in print
by Jules Molk two years before. Finally, we discuss the influence on George
Griss’ negationless mathematics.
keywords: Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer, George Griss, intuitionism, Jules Molk,
principle of the excluded middle
1 Rationale for this translation
In his seminal paper ‘The unreliability of the logical principles’ (1908b), Brouwer
draws for the first time the revisionistic consequences of the general view on logic
that he had presented in his dissertation (Brouwer, 1907, pp. 125–132), by rejecting
the principle of excluded middle. The paper appeared in Dutch; Brouwer’s first
published remarks in more widely read languages on the unreliability of the principle
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of excluded middle occur in Brouwer (1913, p. 92n2, p. 96n1) in English, and in
Brouwer (1914, p. 80) in German.1
An English translation, by Heyting and Gibson, appeared in 1975, in volume 1 of
Brouwer’s Collected Works (Brouwer, 1975, pp. 107–111). The project of attempting
a novel translation seemed to us a worthwhile one against the following background.
Brouwer’s original text must have struck already a Dutch reader in 1908 as a difficult
and unusual one, whose author nevertheless retains a full mastery of his sentences.
In order to preserve for a reader of English at least part of what the original text thus
conveys to a reader of Dutch, we believe that one must, to put it in Schleiermacher’s
memorable terms, move the reader towards the author, instead of moving the author
towards the reader. We have therefore aimed to translate as literally as possible;
to translate Dutch words by English cognates, and to preserve relations between
Dutch cognates among their English translations, wherever appropriate; to preserve
the Germanic structure of the original Dutch to the extent that English, likewise a
Germanic language, allows for it; and to preserve Brouwer’s idiomatic idiosyncracies.
2 Brouwer’s submission of his manuscript
From its novel treatment of the principle of excluded middle, it is clear that
Brouwer drafted his manuscript after the thesis (Brouwer, 1907), which was de-
fended on February 19, 1907; and towards the end of that year, he submitted it to
the Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte.2 In a letter to one of its editors, the philosophically
inclined man of letters Johannes Diderik Bierens de Haan, of December 7, Brouwer
had promised to explain matters further in subsequent papers that would be longer
and better understandable to non-mathematicians. That letter has not survived,
but this element of it is taken up in another letter that did. On January 3, 1908,3
another editor, the physicist P. Kohnstamm, informed Brouwer that the paper had
been accepted that day, in spite of most editors confessing to have understood very
little of it. Van Dalen (1999, p. 108) suspects that the editorial board had also
hesitated to publish Brouwer’s paper because he was not a professional philosopher.
Moreover, the Dutch professional philosophers had not appreciated the attempt by
the student Brouwer, two years earlier, to found a philosophy journal together with
Mannoury. To complicate matters further, the Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte was the
1The Brouwer archive contains an as yet unpublished German translation of the paper at hand, most
likely prepared by Karl Menger in 1925 or 1926, who in those two years was Brouwer’s assistant. In
‘My memories of L.E.J. Brouwer’, he writes in footnote 11: ‘Brouwer’s very moderate assignments
to me were essentially confined to translations of some older writings of his on intuitionism from
Dutch into German.’ (Menger, 1979, p. 252).
2From 1933, that journal appeared as Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psy-
chologie, and from 1970 onwards as Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte. It must not
be confused with the Tijdschrift voor Filosofie that has been published in Leuven since 1939.
3Van Dalen (2011, Online Supplement, pp. 225–226).
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very journal that was founded in reaction to their initiative. On the other hand, it
seems that any storm there might have been had blown over soon, as the title page
of the first volume of the Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte lists Brouwer and Mannoury
among the people ‘who have promised to contribute’.
In his letter, Kohnstamm added that he had succeeded in making the case for
acceptance mainly because of Brouwer’s promise to Bierens de Haan. It is not clear
whether Brouwer ever undertook to write the projected sequels. Also, Kohnstamm
gave Brouwer the option of adding elucidations to the accepted manuscript; for lack
of relevant archive material, we cannot tell whether the published version differs from
the manuscript originally submitted.
Kohnstamm had just published a criticism of psychologism in logic in the Tijd-
schrift (Kohnstamm, 1907), in the form of a negative review of Gerard Heymans’
Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens (Heymans, 1890/1894).4
In a letter of January 18, 1907 to his thesis adviser, Diederik Johannes Korteweg,
Brouwer had likewise expressed an anti-psychologistic stance:
From your characterization of theoretical logic as part of psychology
I gathered that I had expressed myself rather vaguely, because it was
actually my intention to show that theoretical logic on no account has
a psychological meaning, even though it is a science. (Van Dalen, 2011,
p. 37, trl. Van Dalen)
Brouwer did not discuss the matter in the ‘Unreliability’ paper,5 which is the more
regrettable since the issue of the Tijdschrift in which it appears contains also Hey-
mans’ reply to Kohnstamm.6
3 Brouwer’s conception of logic
The conception of logic involved in Brouwer’s remarks on the use of the principle
of the excluded middle in mathematics is that formulated in his dissertation. Logic,
according to Brouwer, is the study of patterns in linguistic records of mathematical
acts of construction, and, as such, a form of applied mathematics. Mathematical
4Among the references in Kohnstamm (1907) we note on pp. 387–388 Husserl’s Logische Unter-
suchungen and Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie, and, indeed, on p. 403, Brouwer’s dissertation – ‘a
stern Dutch book’ (een ernstig Hollandsch boek). However, that reference just concerns Brouwer’s
adoption (Brouwer, 1907, p. 104) of Poincaré’s remark that the world started rotating only with
Copernicus.
5Much later, in 1949, Brouwer mentioned in a letter to David van Dantzig his ‘belief that psy-
chological pictures of intuitionistic mathematics, however interesting they may be, never can be
adequate’ (Van Dalen, 2011, p. 439). For anti-psychologistic readings of Brouwer, see Placek (1999)
and Van Atten (2004, ch. 6).
6Heymans (1908), where Brouwer, Husserl, and Meinong are not mentioned.
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constructions out of the intuition of time are themselves not of a linguistic nature.
Language cannot play a creative role in mathematics; there are no mathematical
truths that can be arrived at by linguistic means (such as logic) that could not, at
least in principle, have been arrived at in acts of languageless mathematical con-
struction (Brouwer, 1907, p. 133).
A correct inference is one where the construction required by its conclusion can be
found from hypothetical actual constructions for its premisses. The hypotheses here
are epistemic ones, in that the premisses are known. Thus, they differ from assump-
tions of the usual natural deduction kind, which merely assume that propositions are
true. For Brouwer’s conception of truth, however, only these epistemic assumptions
play a role, since for him to assume that a proposition is true is to assume that one
has a demonstration of it, that is, that one knows that it is true.7
Our use of logical signs in what follows is meant only as an abbreviatory device.
Although Brouwer in his dissertation had remarked of the language accompanying
logical reasonings that ‘As well as any mathematical language this language can
without much trouble be condensed into symbols’ (Brouwer, 1975, p. 159),8 in his
own writings he persisted in preferring sometimes prolix non-symbolic language. We
will write A → B for ‘A (hypothetical) actual construction for A can be continued
into a construction for B’.9
The logical principles referred to in the title of Brouwer’s paper are those of the
Aristotelian tradition: the principles of the syllogism (in the paper defined by modus
Barbara), of contradiction, and of the excluded third.10 Of course, from lectures
by Gerrit Mannoury Brouwer knew about further developments, in particular those
by Frege and Peano;11 but for his principled criticism it suffices to consider the
7For a discussion, see Sundholm and van Atten (2008, sections 1 to 4).
8As an example, he refers to Whitehead (1898, p. 35ff). ‘Zoo goed als alle wiskundige taal is ook
deze taal zonder moeite te condenseeren tot symbolen’ (Brouwer, 1907, p. 159n).
9Heyting’s later works on logic do employ symbolism, but here we leave it open whether they are
committed to this meaning. See for example Sundholm (1983).
10Brouwer’s choice of terminology here is different from that of his likely logic teacher at Amsterdam,
C.F. Bellaar-Spruyt. The latter’s posthumously published book on formal logic (Bellaar-Spruyt,
1903) lists the principium identitatis, principium contradictionis, principium exclusi medii (also
‘tertium vel medium non datur’, Bellaar-Spruyt 1903, p. 18), and the dictum de omni et nullo,
Bellaar-Spruyt 1903, p. 14. Brouwer’s principle of the syllogism seems to comprise the principium
identitatis and the dictum de omni et nullo. The principles of identity and of syllogism are also
discussed by Poincaré in ‘Sur la nature du raisonnement mathématique’ (Poincaré, 1894), which also
appears, in abridged form, in the first chapter of Science et Hypothèse (Poincaré, 1902); Brouwer
knew in any case the latter of the two.
11These lectures were published in shortened and revised form as Methodologisches und Philosophi-
sches zur Elementar-Mathematik (Mannoury, 1909).
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Aristotelian case.
4 Unreliability in the natural sciences and in wisdom
Brouwer introduces the main question of his paper, that of the reliability of logic
in pure mathematics, by arguing that in two other domains logic is not reliable: the
natural sciences and wisdom.
The problem with the use of logic in the natural sciences, as Brouwer describes it, is
the familiar problem of induction. There is no guarantee that a mathematical model
that explains a given set of observations will correctly predict further observations.
But logic leads from statements in the mathematical model to other statements in
that model. Hence, it may well lead from premisses that agree with observations to
conclusions that do not, and is, in that sense, unreliable.
In wisdom, logic is not reliable for a different type of reason. Logic presupposes
the presence of mathematical constructions, but in wisdom such constructions are
absent. Mathematics embraces time awareness, whereas wisdom discards it.12 Since
time awareness introduces the subject-object distinction, it keeps consciousness out
of what Brouwer later called its ‘deepest home’ (Brouwer, 1949, p. 1235). An attempt
to apply logic to wisdom would require one to impose a mathematical structure on it,
thereby distorting its content. Logic is unreliable in this domain, for logical conclu-
sions from distorted content cannot be expected to reflect that content accurately.13
The question then arises whether in pure mathematics, where, in contrast to natu-
ral science, abstraction has been made from all observational content, and, in contrast
to wisdom, logic is applied to something that does have mathematical structure, the
12Compare this remark in ‘Will, knowledge and speech’:
Mathematical attention is not a necessity but a phenomenon of life subject to the
free will, everyone can find this out for himself by internal experience: every human
being can at will either dream-away time-awareness and the separation between the
Self and the World-of-perception or by his own powers bring about this separation
and call into being in the world-of-perception the condensation of separate things.
(Van Stigt, 1990, pp. 418–419)
(‘Dat wiskundige beschouwing geen noodzaak, doch een aan den vrijen wil onderworpen levensver-
schijnsel is, daarvan kan ieder bij zichzelf de inwendige ervaring opdoen: ieder mensch kan naar
willekeur hetzij zich zonder tijdsgewaarwording en zonder scheiding tusschen Ik en Aanschouwings-
wereld verdroomen, hetzij de genoemde scheiding door eigen kracht voltrekken en in de aanschou-
wingswereld de condensatie van aparte dingen in het leven roepen’, Brouwer 1933, p. 2.)
13On Brouwer’s interest in religion, mysticism, and their relations to science, see Van Dalen (1999,
sections 1.3 and 1.6); Van Stigt (1996); and Koetsier (2005). A comparison with Gödel on this
point is presented in Van Atten and Tragesser (2003).
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use of logic is reliable. The main point of this paper is that it is not.
5 Unreliability in mathematics
Brouwer had already made a case for the possibility of unreliable logical principles
in his dissertation:
And if one succeeds in the construction of linguistic buildings, se-
quences of sentences proceeding according to the logical laws, thereby
departing from linguistic images which could accompany basic math-
ematical truths in actual mathematical buildings, and if it turns out
that those linguistic buildings can never produce the linguistic form
of a contradiction, then all the same they belong to mathematics only
in their quality of a linguistic building, and have nothing to do with
mathematics outside of that building, e.g. with ordinary arithmetic or
geometry.
So the idea that by means of such linguistic buildings we can ob-
tain any knowledge of mathematics apart from that which can be con-
structed directly on the basis of intuition, is mistaken. And more so is
the idea that in this way we can lay the foundations of mathematics,
in other words that we can ensure the reliability of the mathematical
theorems. (Brouwer, 1975, pp. 132–133, original emphasis)14
And in entry xx in the list of propositions submitted to the public defence together
with it, according to Dutch custom that is still today observed in some universities,
he had said:
To secure the reliability of mathematical reasonings one cannot suc-
ceed solely by starting from some sharply formulated axioms and fur-
ther strictly adhering to the laws of theoretical logic. (Brouwer, 1975,
p. 101)15
14En wanneer het gelukt taalgebouwen op te trekken, reeksen van volzinnen, die volgens de wetten
der logica op elkaar volgen, uitgaande van taalbeelden, die voor werkelijke wiskundige gebouwen,
wiskundige grondwaarheden zouden kunnen accompagneeren, en het blijkt dat die taalgebouwen
nooit het taalbeeld van een contradictie zullen kunnen vertoonen, dan zijn ze toch alleen wiskunde
als taalgebouw en hebben met wiskunde buiten dat gebouw, bijv. met de gewone rekenkunde of
meetkunde niets te maken.
Dus in geen geval mag men denken, door middel van die taalgebouwen iets van andere wiskunde,
dan die direct intuitief op te bouwen is, te kunnen te weten komen. En nog veel minder mag men
meenen, op die manier de grondslagen der wiskunde te kunnen leggen, m.a.w. de betrouwbaarheid
der wiskundige eigenschappen te kunnen verzekeren. (Brouwer, 1907, pp. 132–133)
15Het kan niet gelukken, de betrouwbaarheid der wiskundige redeneeringen te verzekeren, enkel
door uit te gaan van eenige scherp gestelde axioma’s en verder streng vast te houden aan de wetten
der theoretische logica. (Brouwer, 1907, Stellingen)
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The reliability of logical reasoning depends on the mathematical context in which it
is applied: it is the context that determines whether the logical reasonings can be
traded in for corresponding mathematical constructions. In the dissertation Brouwer
rejected the attempt to come to know, by the use of logic, something mathematical
that is nonconstructive; he there considered reliable within constructive mathematics
not only the principles of the syllogism (Brouwer, 1907, p. 131) and of contradiction,
but also the principle of excluded middle. The reason is that at the time he read
A ∨ ¬A as ¬A → ¬A:16
While in the syllogism a mathematical element could be discerned, the
proposition:
A function is differentiable or is not differentiable
says nothing; it expresses the same as the following:
If a function is not differentiable, then it is not differentiable.
But the logician, looking at the words of the former sentence, and
discovering a regularity in the combination of words in this and in
similar sentences, here again projects a mathematical system, and he
calls such a sentence an application of the tertium non datur. (Brouwer,
1975, p. 75, original emphasis)17
6 The principle of excluded middle is unreliable
In ‘Unreliability’, Brouwer will advance upon the dissertation in two ways: he
corrects his reading of the principle of excluded middle, and he shows that this
corrected understanding entails the unreliability of a traditional principle within
constructive mathematics itself.
This is the (silently) corrected understanding of the principle of excluded middle:
Now the principium tertii exclusi : this demands that every suppo-
sition18 is either correct or incorrect, mathematically: that of every
16As Van Dalen (1999, pp. 106–107) has pointed out, Brouwer most likely arrived at this reading
under the influence of the logic lectures by Bellaar-Spruyt.
17Was in het syllogisme nog een wiskundig element te onderkennen, de stelling:
Een functie is òf differentieerbaar òf niet differentieerbaar
zegt niets; drukt hetzelfde uit, als het volgende:
Als een functie niet differentieerbaar is, is ze niet differentieerbaar.
Maar de woorden van eerstgenoemde volzin bekijkend, en een regelmatig gedrag in de opvolging
der woorden van deze en van dergelijke volzinnen ontdekkend, projecteert de logicus ook hier een
wiskundig systeem, en noemt zulk een volzin een toepassing van het principe van tertium nondatur.
(Brouwer, 1907, p. 131)
18Suppositions should here not be taken in the sense of abstract propositions in a Platonic realm of
abstract entitites, as in Bolzano or in Frege. What seems to be meant is rather: Every mathematical
assumption that we can make is either correct or incorrect.
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supposed fitting in a certain way of systems in one another, either
the termination or the blockage by impossibility, can be constructed.
(Brouwer, 1908b, p. 156, trl. ours)19
The change of mind is acknowledged in ‘Addenda and corrigenda to “On the Foun-
dations of Mathematics” ’ (Brouwer, 1917, p. 1).
Note that ¬A does not merely mean that no proof of A exists, but that from an
assumed actual demonstration of A one can ‘construct the blockage by impossibility’
(see also Brouwer 1907, p. 127). In this sense, intuitionistic negation is unlike the
classical notion a positive notion, as it involves the existence of a blockage.20
Thus understood, the principle of excluded middle is not reliable, for we do not
have a general decision method as required by the constructive reading. Brouwer’s
claim is not that we can never have such a method: ‘in infinite systems the principium
tertii exclusi is as yet not reliable’ (our emphasis). Brouwer states the first so-
called ‘Brouwerian counterexamples’ or ‘weak counterexamples’ to the principle of
excluded middle, which illustrate its unreliability. These are propositions of which
we are in a position to assert the weak negation, but not the truth or the strong
negation. Of course any open problem is, as such, a weak counterexample to the
principle of excluded middle; the importance of weak counterexamples comes from
the fact that they can be used to show that certain highly general principles have
not yet been established, such as ‘Every set is finite or infinite’ or ‘The continuum
is totally ordered’. Brouwer published weak counterexamples to the principle of
excluded middle also in international journals, but only much later (Brouwer, 1921,
1924, 1925, 1929). By then he had found a uniform technique for constructing weak
19Nu het principium tertii exclusi : dit eischt, dat iedere onderstelling òf juist òf onjuist is, wiskundig:
dat van iedere onderstelde inpassing van systemen op bepaalde wijze in elkaar hetzij de beëindiging,
hetzij de stuiting op onmogelijkheid kan worden geconstrueerd.
20Becker (1927, pp. 498–500), with reference to the section ‘Evidence and truth’ (Evidenz und
Wahrheit) in the sixth of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (Husserl, 1984). This is clearly the
passage by Becker that Heyting has in mind in Königsberg (Heyting, 1931, p. 113):
Eine logische Funktion ist ein Verfahren, um aus einer gegebenen Aussage eine an-
dere Aussage zu bilden. Die Negation ist eine solche Funktion; ihre Bedeutung hat
Becker, im Anschluß an Husserl, sehr deutlich beschrieben. Sie ist nach ihm etwas
durchaus Positives, nämlich die Intention auf einen mit der ursprünglichen Intention
verbundenen Widerstreit.
(‘A logical function is a method for turning a given statement into another statement. Negation is
such a function; Becker, following Husserl, has described its meaning very clearly. It is according
to him something wholly positive, namely the intention directed to a conflict bound up with the
original intention.’ Trl. ours.) Heyting does not give a reference here, but had already mentioned
Becker’s Mathematische Existenz on p. 107.
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counterexamples that depended only on the fact that open problems of a certain
simple type still exist, not on the exact content of these problems.
7 Are there absolutely undecidable propositions?
Brouwer adds the following remark to his explanation of the principle of excluded
middle:
The question of the validity of the principium tertii exclusi is thus
equivalent to the question concerning the possibility of unsolvable math-
ematical problems. For the already proclaimed conviction that unsolv-
able mathematical problems do not exist, no indication of a demon-
stration is present.21 (Brouwer, 1908b, p. 5)
The claim that every mathematical problem is solvable is of course constructively
stronger than the claim that there are no unsolvable problems.22 The former is
equivalent to the principle that for any A, A ∨ ¬A, the latter to the principle that
for any A, ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A); and Brouwer had demonstrated the validity of the latter in
the same paper. Indeed, in the Brouwer archive there is a note from about the same
period 1907–1908 in which the point is made explicitly:
Can one ever demonstrate of a question, that it can never be decided?
No, because one would have to do so by reductio ad absurdum. So
one would have to say: assume that the question has been decided
in sense a, and from that deduce a contradiction. But then it would
have been demonstrated that not-a is true, and the question remains
decided. (Van Dalen, 2001, p. 174n. a, trl. ours)23
Brouwer never published this note. Wavre in 1926 gave the argument for a par-
ticular case, while clearly seeing the general point:
21Compare entry xxi in the list of theses in the dissertation: ‘Ongegrond is de overtuiging van
Hilbert (Gött. Nachr. 1900, pag. 261): “dass ein jedes bestimmte mathematische Problem einer
strengen Erledigung notwendig fähig sein müsse, sei es, dass es gelingt, die Beantwortung der ge-
stellten Frage zu geben, sei es dass die Unmöglichkeit der Lösung und damit die Notwendigkeit des
Misslingens aller Versuche dargetan wird”.’ (Brouwer, 1907, Stellingen)
22See also Wittgenstein (1922, 6.5), Schlick (1935), McCarty (2005), and Martin-Löf (1995) (in
particular the postscript in the reprint in Van der Schaar 2012).
23Zal men nu ooit van een vraag kunnen bewijzen, dat ze nooit uitgemaakt kan worden? Neen, want
dat zou moeten uit het ongerijmde. Men zou dus moeten zeggen: Gesteld dat het was uitgemaakt
in zin a en daaruit afleiden, tot een contradictie kwam. Dan zou echter bewezen zijn, dat niet a
waar was, en de vraag bleef uitgemaakt.
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It suffices to give an example of a number of which one does not know
whether it is algebraic or transcendent in order to give at the same
time an example of a number that, until further information comes in,
could be neither the one nor the other. But, on the other hand, it
would be in vain, it seems to me, to want to define a number that is
neither algebraic nor transcendent, as the only way to show that it is
not algebraic consists in showing that it is absurd that it would be, and
then the number would be transcendent. (Wavre, 1926, p. 66, trl. ours,
original emphasis)24
The general, schematic point was explicitly noted by Heyting in 1934:
Further, the formula ⊢ ¬¬(a ∨ ¬a) should be highlighted. It has the
same meaning25 as ⊢ ¬(¬a∧¬¬a) and expresses Brouwer’s theorem on
the absurdity of the absurdity of the excluded third, and amounts to
saying that a demonstrably unsolvable problem cannot exist. (Heyting,
1934, p. 16)26
8 The principle of excluded middle is consistent
Brouwer also observes that, although the principle of excluded middle is not
schematically valid, none of its instances is false, since ¬(A ∨ ¬A) implies the con-
tradiction ¬A ∧ ¬¬A. This demonstrates the correctness of the principle that, for
any A, ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A). Brouwer concludes that it is always consistent to use (this
form of) the principle of excluded middle but that it does not always lead to truths.
Later, Brouwer gave a refutation of the schema ∀x(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x)) using specifically
intuitionistic principles regarding choice sequences and continuity (Brouwer, 1928).27
24Il suffit donc de fournir l’exemple d’un nombre dont on ne sache s’il est algébrique ou transcendant
pour fournir en même temps l’exemple d’un nombre qui, jusqu’à plus ample information, pourrait
n’être ni l’un ni l’autre. Mais, d’autre part, il serait vain, me semble-t-il, de vouloir définir un
nombre qui ne soit ni algébrique ni transcendant, car la seule manière de prouver qu’il n’est pas
algébrique consistant à prouver qu’il serait absurde qu’il le fût, ce nombre serait transcendant.
[original emphasis]
25Heyting writes ‘gleichbedeutend’. Note that the two formulas are equi-assertible, but have differ-
ent assertion conditions.
26Es sei noch die Formel ⊢ ¬¬(a ∨ ¬a) hervorgehoben, die mit ⊢ ¬(¬a ∧ ¬¬a) gleichbedeutend ist
und den Brouwerschen Satz von der Absurdität der Absurdität des Satzes vom ausgeschlossenen
Dritten zum Ausdruck bringt. Sie besagt, daß es ein nachweisbar unlösbares Problem nicht geben
kann.
27In the Bishop tradition, some versions of the principle of excluded middle that Brouwer devised
counterexamples to have been given a systematic place: lpo, wlpo, llpo. See Bridges and Richman
(1987, ch. 1, section 1).
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Hence Brouwer’s proposal to divide the theorems that are usually considered as hav-
ing been demonstrated into the correct and the non-contradictory ones (Brouwer,
1908b, 7n. 2), that is, those whose reduction to absurdity has been refuted. That is
not a suggestion that there are three truth values, true, non-contradictory, false;28
for a non-contradictory proposition might be proved one day and thereby become
true. This observation on the consistency of the principle of excluded middle would,
in the 1920s, be at the basis of Brouwer’s optimism, expressed in print but nev-
ertheless often neglected, concerning the success of the Hilbert Program, a success
that Brouwer would consider of no general mathematical value (Brouwer 1924, p. 3;
Brouwer 1928, p. 377).
9 Partial validity of the principle of excluded middle
The principle of excluded middle is valid, Brouwer points out, in finite domains,
for questions whether a given construction of finite character29 is possible. Only
finitely many attempts at that construction can be made, and each will succeed or
fail in finitely many steps (see also Brouwer 1955, p. 114). Brouwer came to explain
the genesis of the belief in the validity of the principle of excluded middle as follows:
I am convinced that the axiom of solvability and the principle of ex-
cluded third are both false,30 and that historically the belief in these
dogmas has been caused thusly. First, one has abstracted classical logic
from the mathematics of subsets in a certain finite set, then ascribed
to this logic an a priori existence independent of mathematics, and fi-
nally, on the basis of this alleged apriority, applied it rightlessly to the
mathematics of infinite sets. (Brouwer, 1922, n. 4)31
28Church makes this point clearly in 1928 in ‘On the law of excluded middle’ (Church, 1928),
criticising Barzin and Errera (1927).
29Not, obviously, in the sense of the classical equivalent of Zermelo’s axiom of choice known as the
Teichmüller-Tukey lemma.
30Brouwer came to identify those, but after they had been presented separately.
31Meiner Ueberzeugung nach sind das Lösbarkeitsaxiom und der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten
beide falsch und ist der Glaube an diese Dogmen historisch dadurch verursacht worden, dass man
zunächst aus der Mathematik der Teilmengen einer bestimmten endlichen Menge die klassische
Logik abstrahiert, sodann dieser Logik eine von der Mathematik unabhängige Existenz a priori
zugeschrieben und sie schliesslich auf Grund dieser vermeintlichen Apriorität unberechtigterweise
auf die Mathematik der unendlichen Mengen angewandt hat.
11
See on this point also Brouwer (1924, p. 2; 1929, pp. 423–424; 1949, p. 492; and
1952B, pp. 510–511).
10 Brouwer’s concern with meaning and truth
We wish to discuss one further aspect of the text itself. In it, Brouwer uses neither
the term ‘(wiskundige) waarheid’ ((mathematical) truth), nor ‘betekenis’ (meaning);
but a careful consideration of his Dutch and some of his other writings will reveal
that these really are the notions under consideration.
We begin with truth. In place of ‘waar’ (true) and ‘onwaar’ (false), Brouwer uses
‘juist’ and ‘onjuist’. The term ‘juist’, however, is most commonly translated by ‘right’
and/or ‘correct’, which raises the question as to how this relates to (propositional)
truth. The largest and most authorative dictionary of the Dutch language, the
Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal, lists among the meanings of ‘juist’: ‘Met de
waarheid —, met het wezen van iets in overeenstemming; de waarheid weergevende;
aan de waarheid beantwoordende’ (in agreement with the truth, with the essence of
something; representing the truth; corresponding to the truth), and gives among its
historical examples this sentence from 1897: ‘Met “waarheid” kan men bedoelen de
meest juiste voorstelling van de dingen’ (By ‘truth’ one can mean the most correct
representation of things) – by a happenstance, written by an author who would
become one of Brouwer’s best friends, Frederik van Eeden. Here, the sense of ‘juist’
is given by the translation ‘true’, chosen by Heyting in the Collected Works (Brouwer,
1975, p. 110). We prefer the alternative ‘correct’, however, in order to translate the
different words ‘juist’ and ‘waar’ differently.
Of course correctness can be relative to something else than truth, for example a
convention, a value, or an ideal; but that here truth is meant is clear from the fact
that in his dissertation Brouwer indeed is willing to speak of ‘wiskundige grondwaar-
heden’ (basic mathematical truths),32 in his reply to Mannoury’s review of his dis-
sertation of ‘wiskundige waarheden’ (mathematical truths),33 and in his draft letter
to De Vries, dated February 15, 1907, of ‘de waarheid van de wiskundige stellingen’
(the truth of the mathematical theorems).34 An explicit identification is found in
‘Willen, weten, spreken’ (Will, knowledge and speech) of 1932: ‘juiste (d.w.z. daad-
werkelijk wiskundige beschouwingen doeltreffend indicerende) affirmaties’ (Brouwer,
1933, p. 54), translated by Van Stigt35 as ‘correct affirmations (i.e. effectively indi-
32Brouwer (1907, p. 132).
33Brouwer (1908a, p. 328).
34Van Dalen (2011, Online Supplement, p. 201).
35The Collected Works do not give an English translation of the first two sections of ‘Will, knowledge
and speech’ because of their proximity to the corresponding sections of the first Vienna lecture
(Brouwer, 1929), which they include in German.
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cating actual mathematical viewing)’ (Van Stigt, 1990, p. 424),36 where the viewing
takes place in languageless intuition.37
We now turn to meaning. As we have seen, Brouwer begins his discussion of the
principle of the excluded middle as follows:
Now the principium tertii exclusi : this demands that every supposition
is either correct or incorrect. . .
In the original:
Nu het principium tertii exclusi : dit eischt, dat iedere onderstelling òf
juist òf onjuist is. . .
Brouwer writes ‘demands’ (eischt), not, as one might have expected, ‘means’ (bete-
kent) or ‘asserts’ (beweert). However, the Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal lists
among the meanings of ‘eischen’: ‘Tot voorwaarde voor zijn bestaan, welvaren of
welslagen hebben’: ‘to have as a condition for its existence, prospering, or success’.
Hence, ‘dit principe eischt dat. . . ’ can naturally be understood as ‘for this principle
to hold, what is required is that. . . ’. But this condition clearly amounts to a meaning
specification of the principle.
That Brouwer intends this sense of ‘eischt’ is brought out by a comparison with his
discussion of his first principle, to wit syllogism, where at the corrresponding place
he uses ‘leest in’ (reads . . . as . . . ). The latter unambiguously expresses a concern
with meaning. A coherent interpretation of Brouwer’s remarks should accord the
36At the corresponding place in the first Vienna lecture, Brouwer had written: ‘zutreffenden
(d.h. tatsächliche mathematische Betrachtungen andeutenden) Aussagen’ (Brouwer, 1929, p. 158).
We here note that the range of meaning of the German ‘zutreffend’ is included in and much narrower
than that of the Dutch ‘juist’.
37The visual metaphor is not often used in Brouwer’s writings. In the dissertation one finds:
Now we have seen that classical logic studies the linguistic counterpart of logical rea-
sonings, i.e. of reasonings on relations of whole and part for arbitrary mathematically
constructed systems; from the fact that we see these mathematical systems we may
conclude that here the sentences succeeding one another according to classical logic,
will never show contradictions, because they correspond to acts of mathematical con-
struction. (Brouwer, 1975, p. 88, original emphasis)
(‘Nu hebben we gezien, dat de klassieke logica bestudeert de taalbegeleiding der logische redeneerin-
gen, d.w.z. der redeneeringen in relaties van geheel en deel voor willekeurige wiskundig opgebouwde
systemen; en we weten uit het feit, dat we die wiskundige systemen zien, dat daar de volgens de
klassieke logica elkaar opvolgende volzinnen, die immers wiskundige bouwhandelingen begeleiden,
nooit contradicties zullen vertoonen’, Brouwer 1907, pp. 159–160, original emphasis.)
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same sense to these two verbs;38 the disambiguation of ‘eischt dat’ should pick out
the sense in which it has the same meaning as ‘leest in’.39
11 Precursors
Brouwer was not the first who voiced criticism or hesitations about either the
usefulness or the validity of the principle of excluded middle in a purely mathematical
context. From the 1870s, Kronecker objected to the unlimited use of the principle of
excluded middle and of definition by undecided separation of cases. For example, in
his treatise on algebraic numbers of 1882, he wrote on the factorization of polynomial
functions:
The definition of irreducibility drawn up in section 1 lacks a secure
grounding as long as no method has been indicated by which it can
be decided whether a definite given function is irreducible according to
that definition or not. (Kronecker, 1882, pp. 10–11)40
adding in a footnote,
The analogous need, which as a matter of fact has often remained
neglected, arises in many other cases, in definitions as in demonstra-
tions, and on another occasion I will come back to this generally and
thoroughly. (Kronecker, 1882, p. 11n)41
His student Jules Molk42 gave voice to the doubts of his Doktorvater in the printed
version of his Berlin dissertation from 1885:
The definitions should be algebraic and not only logical. It does not
suffice to say: ‘A thing exists or it does not exist’. One has to show
what being and not being mean, in the particular domain in which we
are moving. Only thus do we make a step forward. (Molk, 1885, p. 8,
trl. ours)43
38Brouwer’s remark on the second principle does not contain a corresponding verb at all.
39Koss (2013, p. 75) reaches the conclusion that in this paper Brouwer’s concern was neither with
meaning nor with truth. As we show above, the linguistic facts do not bear him out.
40Die im Artikel 1 aufgestellte Definition der Irreduktibilität entbehrt solange einer sicheren Grund-
lage, als nicht eine Methode angegeben ist, mittels deren bei einer bestimmten vorgelegten Funktion
entschieden werden kann, ob dieselbe der aufgestellten Definition gemäß irreduktibel ist oder nicht.
41Das analoge Bedürfnis, welches freilich häufig unbeachtet geblieben ist, zeigt sich in vielen anderen
Fällen, bei Definitionen wie bei Beweisführungen und ich werde bei einer anderen Gelegenheit in
allgemeiner und eingehender Weise darauf zurückkommen.
42December 8, 1857, Strasbourg – May 7, 1914, Nancy.
43Les définitions devront être algébriques et non pas logiques seulement. Il ne suffit pas de dire :
‘Une chose est ou elle n’est pas’. Il faut montrer ce que veut dire être et ne pas être, dans le domaine
particulier dans lequel nous nous mouvons. Alors seulement nous faisons un pas en avant.
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Molk became professor in Nancy, and was the editor-in-chief and driving force behind
the French version of Felix Klein’s Enzyklopädie der mathematischen Wissenschaften
und ihren Grenzgebiete. He translated and augmented, especially concerning foun-
dational matters, Pringsheim’s beautiful surveys of topics in elementary analysis. In
Book I, volume I.3, section 10, ‘Point de vue de L. Kronecker’, Molk considerably
elaborated upon the above brief remark from his dissertation:
Analysis should, on the other hand, refrain from general considera-
tions of a logical kind alien to its object. In Analysis definitions may
introduce nothing but auxiliary notions that facilitate the study of
the various natural groups that one forms to study the properties of
numbers. These auxiliary notions must have an arithmetical character
and not a merely logical one, whence they can only be about groups
of which each element can be effectively obtained by means of a finite
number of operations, and not about groups simply determined by a
non-contradictory logical convention.
Similarly, the logical evidentness44 of a reasoning does not suffice
to legitimize the use of that reasoning in Analysis. In order to give a
mathematical demonstration of a proposition, it does not suffice, for
example, to establish that the contrary proposition implies a contra-
diction. One has to give a procedure that, operating on the elements
under consideration, by means of a finite number of arithmetical op-
erations in the old sense of the word, permits one to obtain the result
formulated by the proposition to be demonstrated. This procedure con-
stitutes the essence of the demonstration; it is not an addition to it.
. . .
The principle of economy in science – economy of time, economy
of efforts – in Analysis leads us to the absolute and relative ratio-
nal numbers: that introduction is legitimate, because its only effect is
to shorten the deductions without changing their character. To every
proposition about rational numbers, for example expressed by an equa-
tion, corresponds a congruence taken according to an easily determined
module or system of modules.
. . .
The character of demonstrations is, on the contrary, completely
changed by the introduction of arbitrary irrational numbers. One can-
not, moreover, give any definition of these numbers except a logical one,
determining them, but not mathematically defining them. It is that log-
ical (but not mathematical) definition that confers on (infinite) sets of
44The French here has ‘évidence’, in the sense of Cartesian clarity. This meaning, ‘evidence of’,
is the first given by the oed. The more familiar, and in Anglo-American philosophy all-pervasive
‘evidence for’ exists only in English. For further discussion, see Sundholm (2014).
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rational numbers that define so-called arbitrary irrational numbers, the
character of an organic sequence. Therefore, those numbers, according
to L. Kronecker, cannot rightfully occur in the definitive demonstra-
tion of a proposition of Analysis. (Molk, 1904, pp. 159–61, trl. ours,
original emphasis)45
Any reader of Brouwer’s ‘Unreliability’ will be struck by the coincidence of the views
expressed, even down to some of the finer details: the rejection of indirect existence
proofs; the prohibition of blind, merely symbolic reasoning; the explicit separation
between demonstrated propositions and non-contradictory ones. In view of this, the
question arises whether Brouwer was aware of Molk’s treatment. According to the
central Dutch library catalogue,46 in the Netherlands one copy of the original edition
of the article by Pringsheim and Molk was present, namely at the library of the
University of Amsterdam. Unfortunately, that library has not been able to answer
our question exactly when this fascicule of the Encyclopédie became available.47
On the other hand, we wish to note that neither in Brouwer’s extensive notebooks
45L’Analyse doit, d’autre part, se garder de considérations générales d’ordre logique étrangères à son
objet. Les définitions ne doivent introduire en Analyse que des notions auxiliaires facilitant l’étude
des divers groups naturels que l’on forme pour étudier les propriétés des nombres. Ces notions
auxiliaires doivent avoir un caractère arithmétique et non logique seulement, en sorte qu’elles ne
sauraient porter que sur des groups dont chaque élément puisse être effectivement obtenu au moyen
d’un nombre fini d’opérations, et non sur des groupes simplement détermines par une convention
logique non-contradictoire.
De même l’évidence logique d’un raisonnement ne suffit pas pour légitimer l’emploi de ce rai-
sonnement en Analyse. Pour avoir donné une démonstration mathématique d’une proposition, il ne
suffit pas, par exemple d’avoir établie que la proposition contraire implique contradiction. Il faut
donner un procédé permettant d’obtenir, au moyen d’un nombre fini d’opérations arithmétiques au
sens ancien du mot, effectuées sur les éléments que l’on envisage, le résultât qu’énonce la proposi-
tion à démontrer. C’est ce procédé qui constitue l’essence de la démonstration ; il ne vient pas s’y
ajouter.
. . .
Le principe de l’économie dans la science, économie de temps, économie d’efforts, nous amène en
Analyse les nombres rationnels absolus et relatifs : cette introduction est légitime, puis-quelle n’a
pour effet que d’abréger les déductions sans en changer le caractère. A toute proposition concernant
les nombres rationnels, exprimée par une égalité par exemple, correspond une congruence prise
suivant un module ou un système de modules toujours faciles à déterminer.
. . .
Le caractère des démonstrations est, au contraire, complètement changé par l’introduction de
nombres irrationnels quelconques. On ne peut d’ailleurs donner de ces nombres qu’une définition
logique, les déterminant, mai ne les définissant pas mathématiquement. C’est cette définition logique
(mais non mathématique) qui confère aux ensembles (infinis) de nombres rationnels, que l’on dit
définir des nombres irrationnels quelconques, le caractère d’une suite organique. Ces nombres ne
peuvent donc, suivant L. Kronecker, figurer a aucun titre dans la démonstration définitive d’une
proposition d’Analyse.
46Nederlandse Centrale Catalogus.
47Brouwer occasionally made similar inquiries. Brouwer to his University Library, August 3, 1929:
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1904–1907, which show Brouwer to have been an omnivorous reader, nor in his
remaining correspondence, nor in the Dissertation have we found a reference to the
article by Pringsheim and Molk, nor to any other article in the Encylopédie, nor to
any other of Molk’s writings.
Also some younger French mathematicians were sensitive to the issues later raised
by Brouwer. For example, Lebesgue (1875–1941) had stated, in a letter to Borel
published in 1905:48
Although I strongly doubt that one will ever name a set that is neither
finite nor infinite, the impossibility of such a set seems to me not to
have been demonstrated.49
Note that one of the examples in Brouwer’s paper of a principle that has not been
demonstrated is ‘every number is finite or infinite’. In the intuitionistic setting,
an example of a set that is neither finite nor infinite was given in Brouwer (1924,
pp. 3–4).
However, in spite of the early efforts by Kronecker, only with Brouwer do we get
a comprehensive development of mathematics excluding any ‘unreliable’ use of the
principle of excluded middle.
12 Direct influence
In spite of its historical significance, Brouwer’s paper has apparently had surpris-
ingly little direct influence on others, apart from sporadic references in Brouwer’s
Undersigned would much appreciate it if he could learn the exact date on which Heft
2 of Band 142 of the Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik (Crelle’s
Journal) was received at the University Library. The date probably lies in the first
months of 1913.
Many thanks in advance
Sincerely
Your obedient servant
L.E.J. Brouwer. (Van Dalen, 2011, Online Supplement, p. 1743, trl. ours)
(‘Ondergeteekende zou het op hoogen prijs stellen, indien hij den preciezen datum kon vernemen,
waarop Heft 2 van Band 142 van het Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik (Crelle’s
Journal) ter Universiteits-bibliotheek is ontvangen. De datum ligt waarschijnlijk in de eerste maan-
den van 1913. Met beleefden dank bij voorbaat, Hoogachtend, Uw Dienstwillige L.E.J. Brouwer.’)
The issue in question contained Brouwer’s paper ‘Über den natürlichen Dimensionsbegriff’ (Brouwer,
1913); the answer to his question here is January 27, 1913 (Van Dalen, 2008, p. 358).
48Baire et al. (1904, p. 269).
49Bien que je doute fort qu’on nomme jamais un ensemble qui ne soit ni fini, ni infini, l’impossibilité
d’un tel ensemble ne me paraît pas démontré.
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own work and that of Heyting. The exception is George François Cornelis Griss, as
will now be explained.50
There is a direct connection between Brouwer’s ‘Unreliability’ and Griss’ develop-
ment, in a series of papers published from 1944 to 1951, of a version of intuitionism
without negation.51 Griss had first explained his rationale to Brouwer directly, in a
letter of April 19, 1941:
Showing that something is not true, i.e. showing the incorrectness of a
supposition is not an intuitively clear act. For it is impossible to have
an intuitively clear concept of an assumption that later turns out to be
even wrong. One must maintain the demand that only building things
up from the foundations makes sense in intuitionistic mathematics.
(Van Dalen, 2011, p. 402, trl. Van Dalen)52
This was repeated almost verbatim in Griss’ publication of 1946:
On philosophic grounds I think the use of the negation in intuitionistic
mathematics has to be rejected. Proving that something is not right,
i.e. proving the incorrectness of a supposition, is no intuitive method.
For one cannot have a clear conception of a supposition that eventually
proves to be a mistake. Only construction without the use of negation
has some sense in intuitionistic mathematics. (Griss, 1946, p. 675)
However, where in the article Griss prefers not to go further into the philosophical
issue and goes on to discuss mathematical consequences, in the letter he first offers
a justification for his basic idea. It takes the form of a comment on Brouwer’s
‘Unreliability’:
50The ‘Unreliability’ paper may further have had an indirect influence already on Husserl. In 1928
with his ‘Intuitionistische Betrachtungen über den Formalismus’ (Brouwer, 1928), Brouwer returned,
with explicit reference, to the themes of the earlier paper. The relevance of Brouwer’s 1928 paper
for Husserl’s Formale und transzendentale Logik (Husserl, 1929) is clear and, several years ago, was
emphasized to one of us by Byung-Hak Ha. Afterwards Thomas Vongehr at the Husserl Archives in
Louvain found an entry in an old card catalogue that showed that Husserl had owned an offprint of
that paper. Unfortunately, the offprint itself was no longer to be found. Brouwer and Husserl met
in Amsterdam in April 1928 (Van Dalen, 2011, Online Supplement, p. 1515; Husserl, 1994, vol. 5,
p. 156), and it is likely that Brouwer gave the offprint to Husserl then, or sent it in the aftermath.
However, in spite of its topical closeness to some of the main themes of Formale und transzendentale
Logik, the latter contains no reference to Brouwer. (We express our thanks to Ha and Vongehr.)
51 Griss (1944, 1946, 1950, 1951a,b,c). For more on Griss and his work, see Heyting (1955) and
Franchella (1993).
52Aantonen, dat iets niet waar is, d.w.z. de onjuistheid van een veronderstelling aantonen, is niet
een intuïtief-duidelijke handelwijze. Van een veronderstelling, die later zelfs blijkt fout te zijn, kan
men namelijk onmogelijk een intuïtief-duidelijke voorstelling hebben. Men moet de eis handhaven,
dat alleen het opbouwen vanaf de grondslagen in de intuïtionistische wiskunde betekenis heeft.
(Van Dalen, 2011, Online Supplement, p. 2142)
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Although my ideas about the foundations of mathematics are not com-
pletely identical to yours, the differences are unimportant for what fol-
lows, so, for example, I can agree completely with your considerations
in the Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 2nd volume, 1908. Let me just
remark that the concept of negation does not explicitly occur in the
formulation of the foundations of mathematics, but only in the exam-
ination of the validity of the logical principles. You say there:
The principle of contradiction is just as little in dispute;
the execution of the fitting of a system a in a particular
way into a system b, and finding that this fitting turns
out to be impossible are mutually exclusive.53
What does impossibility of a ‘fitting in’ mean here?
In the first place this can mean that one assumes the possibility
of fitting, and that this assumption leads to a contradiction. This
manner far exceeds the construction of mathematical systems on the
basis of the ur-intuition, and as I remarked in the beginning, one cannot
clearly obtain a conception of it. If one still accepts it, then one takes
in principle a similar step, as when one accepts the principle of the
excluded third. An element of arbitrariness enters in our idea about
what is and what is not admissible in mathematics, if one does not
stick strictly to the requirement that one only builds up mathematical
systems from the foundations which are given in the ur-intuition.
Another meaning which can be given to ‘finding that this fitting of
a system a into a system b turns out to be impossible’ might be this:
that the system a demonstrably differs (in that case this concept has
to be defined) from every system that can be fitted into b. One asks
for example whether e is an algebraic number and one finds that e is
positively transcendent so e demonstrably differs from each algebraic
number. If need be, one can even answer the question whether e is
algebraic by: e is not algebraic, but then we have assigned a new
meaning to the word ‘not’.54
53The translation of this passage that we will give below is a little different from this one by Van
Dalen, but not substantially so. Note that another passage that Griss could have referred to is
Brouwer (1907, p. 127).
54Hoewel mijn ideeën over de grondslagen van wiskunde niet volkomen gelijk zijn aan de Uwe,
zijn de verschillen voor het volgende niet van belang, zodat ik bijv. geheel kan aansluiten bij Uw
beschouwingen in het Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 2de jaargang, 1908. Alleen merk ik op, dat het
begrip negatie bij het formuleren van de grondslagen der wiskunde niet expliciet optreedt, maar pas
bij het onderzoek naar de geldigheid der logische principes. U zegt daar:
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Brouwer’s paper ‘Essentially negative properties’ (Brouwer, 1948) was written in
response to Griss. In his letter of 1941, Griss had remarked that ‘no real number
a is known about which it has been proved that it cannot possibly be equal to 0
(a 6= 0), while at the same time it has not been proven that the number differs
positively from 0 (a # 0)’. Brouwer in his paper constructed a real number a with
just that property; but he did not provide an accompanying philosophical account
as an alternative to Griss’ view.
An occasion for Brouwer, Griss and others to debate these matters in public would
have been a meeting planned by S.I. Dockx.55 A letter of Beth to Dockx of July 8,
1949, suggests that also Freudenthal, Heyting, and Van Dantzig were invited, but
at the same time makes it clear that Brouwer declined because he did not want
to participate in an event with Freudenthal (Van Dalen, 2011, Online Supplement,
p. 2446).56 To the best of our knowledge, the meeting never took place.
Heyting published a reaction in 1955, ‘G.F.C. Griss and his negationless intuition-
istic mathematics’. While Heyting noted that ‘unrealized suppositions’ are implicit
in all general statements, so that banishing such suppositions would reduce mathe-
matics to an ‘utterly unimportant and uninteresting subject’ (Heyting, 1955, p. 95),
he did not provide a detailed confrontation with the arguments of Griss. It can be
argued that Brouwer’s dissertation in effect contains an answer to Griss’ objection:
according to Van Atten (2009), the view expressed on the hypothetical judgement
at the beginning of chapter 3 of Brouwer’s thesis (Brouwer, 1907, pp. 125–127) is
that logical reasoning does not operate on constructions, let alone hypothetical ones,
Evenmin is aanvechtbaar het principe van contradictie: het volvoeren van de in-
passing van een systeem a op een bepaalde wijze in een systeem b, en het stuiten
op de onmogelijkheid van die inpassing sluiten elkaar uit.
Wat betekent hierin de onmogelijkheid van een inpassing?
Ten eerste kan dit betekenen, dat men van de mogelijkheid van een inpassing uitgaat en die
veronderstelling ad absurdum voert. Deze wijze van doen gaat echter ver uit boven het opbouwen
van wiskundige systemen op grond van de oerintuïtie, en men kan er zich, zoals ik reeds in het begin
opmerkte, geen duidelijke voorstelling van maken. Aanvaardt men ze toch, dan doet men in principe
een dergelijke stap, als wanneer men het beginsel van het uitgesloten derde zou aanvaarden. Er komt
een element van willekeur in onze opvatting over wat al of niet toelaatbaar is in de wiskunde, als men
niet streng vasthoudt aan de eis alleen wiskundige systemen op te bouwen vanaf de grondslagen,
die in de oerintuïtie gegeven zijn.
Een andere betekenis, die aan de uitdrukking ‘stuiten op de onmogelijkheid van een inpassing
van een systeem a in een systeem b’ gehecht kan worden, zou deze kunnen zijn, dat het systeem a
aanwijsbaar verschilt (dit begrip moet dan gedefinieerd zijn) van ieder systeem, dat in het systeem b
kan worden ingepast. Men vraagt bijvoorbeeld, of e een algebraïsch getal is en vindt, dat e positief
transcendent is, zodat e aanwijsbaar van ieder algebraïsch getal verschilt. Desnoods kan men zelfs
op de vraag, of e algebraïsch is, antwoorden: e is niet algebraïsch, maar dan hebben we aan het
woord ‘niet’ een nieuwe betekenis toegekend.
55Stanislas Isnard Dockx, Antwerp 1901–Brussels 1985.
56For an account of Brouwer’s by then long-standing conflict with Freudenthal, see Van Dalen (2005,
pp. 721–728, 753–757, and 794–799).
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but on conditions on constructions. The difference is that these conditions, whether
fulfillable or not, can themselves be represented as actual objects.
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De onbetrouwbaarheid der logische principes
door
L.E.J. Brouwer
[Noot Brouwer voorafgaand aan de herdruk van 1919] Dit opstel zou ook thans nog
in denzelfden vorm geschreven kunnen zijn. Medestanders hebben de er verdedigde
opvattingen nog weinig gevonden.
1. De wetenschap beschouwt herhaling in den tijd van als onderling gelijk stelbare
volgreeksen van qualitatieve verscheidenheid in den tijd. Dit vereenzamen der idee
tot waarneembaarheid, en als zoodanig tot herhaalbaarheid, verschijnt na religielooze
scheiding1 tusschen subject en tot iets anders geworden onbereikte bereikbaarheid.
De drang tot bereiking dezer bereikbaarheden wordt in het intellect volgens een
wiskundig systeem van gestelde stelbaarheden, geboren uit abstractie van herhaling
en herhaalbaarheden, gestuurd langs onmiddellijke bereiktheden.
Alles wat verschijnen kan als onbereikte bereikbaarheid, laat zich in systemen
van gesteldheden intelligeeren, zoo ook religie; maar dan is de religieuze wetenschap
religieloos: gewetensussend, of ijdel spel, of slechts van doelnajagende beteekenis.2
En, als alle religieloosheid, heeft wetenschap nòch religieuze betrouwbaarheid, nòch
betrouwbaarheid in zich. | Allerminst kan een wiskundig systeem van gesteldheden, 153
los van de waarnemingen, die het intelligeerde, onbepaald vervolgd, betrouwbaar
blijven in het richten langs die waarnemingen.
Zoodat onafhankelijk van de waarneming volvoerde logische redeneeringen, die
immers beteekenen wiskundige transformaties in het intelligeerende wiskundig sys-
teem, uit wetenschappelijk aanvaarde praemissen onaannemelijke conclusies kunnen
afleiden.3
De klassieke opvatting, die in de ervaringsgeometrie uit aanvaarde praemissen door
volgens de logische principes gevoerde redeneeringen slechts onaanvechtbare conclu-
1een vermogen, voortgekomen uit de oerzonde van vrees of begeerte, maar wederkeerend, ook zonder
levende vrees of begeerte. vgl. L.E.J. Brouwer. Leven, Kunst en Mystiek. pag. 13–23.
2t.a.p. pag. 27.
3t.a.p. pag. 20, 21.
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The unreliability of the logical principles
by
L.E.J. Brouwer
[Brouwer’s note preceeding the 1919 reprint] This essay could also today still be
written in the same form. The opinions defended in it have, as yet, found few
supporters.
1. Science considers repetition in time of interidentifiable succession-sequences of
qualitative differentiation through time. This isolating of the idea into an observable,
and as such a repeatable, emerges after areligiousa separation1 between the subject
and an unreached reachable that has become something separate. In the intellect,
the urge to reach these reachables is conducted along things immediately reached,
according to a mathematical system of posited positables, born out of abstraction of
repetition and repeatables.
Everything that can emerge as unreached reachable lets itself be intelligized in sys-
tems of posits,b thus also religion; but then religious science is areligious: conscience-
numbing, or idle play, or of merely goal-chasing significance.2
And science, as everything areligious, possesses neither religious reliability, nor
reliability in itself. Least of all can a mathematical system of posits, separated from
the observations it made intelligible, when continued indefinitely, remain reliable
when directing along those observations.
Consequently logical argumentations, which, after all, consist in mathematical
transformations in the mathematical system that makes [the observations] intelli-
gible, may derive unlikely conclusions from scientifically accepted premises, when
carried out independently of observation.3
The classical conception, which in experiential geometry witnessed reasonings —
from accepted premises, carried out according to logical principles — derive only
1A capacity, rooted in the original sin of fear or desire, but reappearing also without living fear or
desire. Cf. Brouwer (1905, pp. 13–23).
2Brouwer (1905, p. 27).
3Brouwer (1905, pp. 20, 21).
aNB not ‘antireligious’.
b‘Posit’ not in Quine’s sense, but rather like Kant’s ‘Setzung’.
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sies zag afleiden, induceerde de logische redeneeringen als methode van opbouw der
wetenschap en de logische principes als menschelijke vermogens tot opbouw van we-
tenschap.
Maar de geometrische redeneeringen gelden slechts voor een onafhankelijk van
eenige ervaring in het intellect opbouwbaar wiskundig systeem, en dat een zoo po-
pulaire groep van waarnemingen als de geometrie het bedoelde wiskundig systeem
zoo blijvend verdraagt, verdient, als alle proefhoudende natuurwetenschap, met wan-
trouwen te worden aangezien.
Het inzicht van de wetenschappelijke onbetrouwbaarheid der logische redeneerin-
gen maakt, dat de conclusiën van Aristoteles omtrent de constitutie der natuur zon-
der practische verifieering niet overtuigen; dat de waarheid, die bij Spinoza opengaat,
geheel onafhankelijk wordt gevoeld van zijn logische systematiek; dat men niet ge-
hinderd wordt door de antinomieën van Kant, en evenmin door het ontbreken van
in al haar consequenties door te voeren physische hypothesen.
| Bovendien zijn bij de betoogen betreffende op wiskundige systemen gespannen 154
ervaringswerkelijkheden de logische principes niet het richtende, maar in de bege-
leidende taal achteraf opgemerkte regelmatigheid, en zoo men los van wiskundige
systemen spreekt volgens die regelmatigheid, is er altijd gevaar voor paradoxen als
die van Epimenides.
2. In religieuze waarheid, in wijsheid, die de splitsing opheft in subject en iets
anders, is geen wiskundig intelligeeren, daar de verschijning van den tijd niet langer
wordt aanvaard, nog minder dus betrouwbaarheid van logica. Integendeel, de taal der
inkeerende wijsheid verschijnt ordeloos, onlogisch, omdat ze nooit kan voeren langs
in het leven gedrukte systemen van gesteldheden, slechts hun breking kan begeleiden,
en zoo misschien de wijsheid, die die breking doet, kan laten opengaan.4
3. Blijft de vraag, of dan althans de logische principes vaststaan voor van levensin-
houd vrije wiskundige systemen, voor systemen opgetrokken uit de gestelde abstractie
4t.a.p. pag. 47 vlgg., 65 vlgg.
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incontrovertible conclusions, induced the logical reasonings as method for building
science, and the logical principles as human capacities for building science.
But the geometrical reasonings are valid only for a mathematical system that can
be built in the intellect independently of any experience, and that such a popular
group of observations as geometry corroborates the mathematical system in question
so enduringly, deserves, like all experimental natural science, to be regarded with
distrust.
The insight of the scientific unreliability of the logical reasonings has as conse-
quence that Aristotle’s conclusions on the constitution of nature are unconvincing
without verification in practice; that the truth unveiled in Spinoza is experienced
wholly independently of his logical architectonic; that one is not hindered by the anti-
nomies of Kant, nor by the lack of physical hypotheses that can be carried through
in all their consequences.
Moreover, regarding discourse concerning experiential realities that have been cast
on mathematical systems, the logical principles are not directive, but regularities
that have afterward been noticed in the accompanying language, and if one speaks
according to these regularities with no link to mathematical systems, there is always
the danger of paradoxes such as that of Epimenides.
2. In religous truth, in wisdom, which suspends the splitting into subject and
something separate, there is no mathematical intellection, as the appearance of time
is no longer accepted, even less thus the reliability of logic. On the contrary, the
language of inward-turning wisdom appears without order, illogical, because it can
never carry along systems of posits pressed upon life, but can only accompany their
breakdown, and thus perhaps unveil the wisdom that effects the break.4
3. The question remains whether then the logical principles hold at least for math-
ematical systems that are free of living content,c for systems erected from posited
4Brouwer (1905, p. 47ff,65ff).
cFor the expression ‘living content’, compare: ‘. . . the existence of that mathematical reasoning
system does not entail that it lives, in other words that it accompanies a chain of thoughts . . . ’
Brouwer (1907, p. 138n, emphasis Brouwer, trl. ours) (. . . volgt uit het bestaan van dat wiskundig
redeneersysteem nog niet, dat dat taalsysteem leeft, m.a.w. een aaneenschakeling van gedachten
begeleidt. . . ).
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van herhaling en herhaalbaarheid, uit de gestelde inhoudslooze tijdsintuïtie, uit de
oer-intuïtie der wiskunde.5 Door alle tijden is in wiskunde met vertrouwen logisch
geredeneerd; nooit aarzelde men, door logica uit postulaten getrokken conclusies te
aanvaarden, waar de postulaten gelden. In dezen tijd zijn echter paradoxen gecon-
strueerd, die wiskundige paradoxen schijnen6, en wantrouwen wekken tegen het | 155
vrije gebruik van logica in wiskunde, zoodat enkele wiskundigen hun vooronderstel-
ling van logica in wiskunde loslaten, en logica en wiskunde tezamen trachten op te
bouwen7, in aansluiting aan de door Peano gegrondveste school der logistiek. Aan-
getoond kan echter worden8, dat deze paradoxen voortkomen uit dezelfde dwaling
als die van Epimenides, dat ze namelijk ontstaan, waar regelmatigheid in de taal,
die wiskunde begeleidt, wordt uitgebreid over een taal van wiskundige woorden, die
geen wiskunde begeleidt; dat verder de logsitiek eveneens zich bezighoudt met de
wiskundige taal in plaats van met de wiskunde zelf, dus de wiskunde zelf niet ver-
heldert; dat ten slotte alle paradoxen verdwijnen, als men zich beperkt, slechts te
spreken over expliciet uit de oer-intuïtie opbouwbare systemen, m.a.w. in plaats van
logica door wiskunde, wiskunde door logica laat vooronderstellen.
Zoo blijft nu alleen nog de meer gespecialiseerde vraag: “Kan men bij zuiver wis-
kundige constructies en transformaties de voorstelling van het opgetrokken wiskun-
dig systeem tijdelijk verwaarloozen, en zich bewegen in het accompagneerend taal-
gebouw, geleid door de principes van syllogisme, van contradictie en van tertium
exclusum, in vertrouwen dat door tijdelijke oproeping van de voorstelling der bere-
deneerde wiskundige constructies telkens elk deel van het betoog zou kunnen worden
gewettigd?”
Hier zal blijken, dat dit vertrouwen voor de beide eerste principes wèl, voor het
laatste niet gegrond is.
Het syllogisme vooreerst leest in de inpassing van een | systeem b in een systeem c 156
en de daarmee samengaande inpassing van een systeem a in het systeem b een directe
inpassing van het systeem a in het systeem c, wat niet anders is dan een tautologie.
5vgl. L.E.J. Brouwer. Over de Grondslagen der Wiskunde. pag. 8, 81, 98, 179.
6Burali-Forti. (Rendiconti del circolo Matematico di Palermo. 1897. p. 164).
Zermelo. (Mathematische Annalen 59). Koenig. (ibid. 61).
Richard. (Revue générale des Sciences. 1905).
Russell. (The Principles of Mathematics. Part I. Chap. X).
Voor pogingen tot oplossing dezer paradoxen vgl., behalve de opstellers zelf: Poincaré. (Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale. 1905 no. 6, 1906 no. 1, 3). Mollerup. (Mathematische Annalen 64).
Schoenflies. (Bericht über die Mengenlehre. ii. Kap. i. §7).
7in het bijzonder Hilbert in Verhandlungen des internationalen Mathematiker-Congresses in Hei-
delberg 1904. p. 174.
8Grondslagen der Wiskunde. iii.
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abstraction of repetition and repeatability, from the posited contentless intuition of
time, from the [Ur-]intuition of mathematics.5 Through all ages, in mathematics one
has reasoned logically with confidence; never did one hesitate to accept conclusions
drawn from postulates by logic, where the postulates hold. In this time, however,
paradoxes have been constructed that seem to be mathematical paradoxes,6 and
that arouse distrust against the free use of logic in mathematics, so that some math-
ematicians let go of their presupposition of logic in mathematics, and try to build
up logic together with mathematics,7 following the school of logistics founded by
Peano. It can be shown,8 however, that these paradoxes result from the same error
as that of Epimenides, namely, that they arise where regularities in the language
that accompanies mathematics are extended over a language of mathematical words
that does not accompany mathematics; that, further, logistics too is concerned with
the mathematical language instead of with mathematics itself, thus does not clarify
mathematics itself; that, finally, all paradoxes disappear, when one restricts oneself
to speaking only of systems that explicitly can be built out of the Ur-intuition, in
other words, when instead of letting mathematics presuppose logic, one lets logic
presuppose mathematics.
Thus, now only the more specific question still remains: ‘Can one, in the case
of purely mathematical constructions and transformations, temporarily neglect the
presentation of the mathematical system that has been erected, and move in the
accompanying linguistic building, guided by the principles of the syllogism, of con-
tradiction, and of tertium exclusum, always confident that, by momentary evocation
of the presentation of the mathematical constructions suggested by this reasoning,
each part of the discourse could be justified?’
Here it will turn out that this confidence is well-founded for each of the first two
principles, but not for the last.
To begin with, the syllogism reads the fitting of a system b into a system c and
the concommitant fitting of a system a into the system b as a direct fitting of the
system a into the system c, which is nothing but a tautology.d
Nor can the principle of contradiction be assailed: completing the fitting of a
5Cf. Brouwer (1907, pp. 8, 81, 98,179.).
6Burali-Forti (1897), Zermelo (1904), Koenig (1905), Richard (1905), Russell (1903, Part I. Chap. X).
For attempts at solving these paradoxes see, besides the proposers themselves: Poincaré (1905–1906),
Mollerup (1907), Schoenflies (1908, Kap. I. § 7). [Note that the preface to that work is dated ‘im
Oktober 1907’.]
7In particular Hilbert in Hilbert (1905).
8Brouwer (1907, ch. iii).
dA tautology in the sense of, for example, Kant, not Wittgenstein.
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Evenmin is aanvechtbaar het principe van contradictie: het volvoeren van de in-
passing van een systeem a op bepaalde wijze in een systeem b, en het stuiten op de
onmogelijkheid van die inpassing sluiten elkander uit.
Nu het principium tertii exclusi : dit eischt, dat iedere onderstelling òf juist òf
onjuist is, wiskundig: dat van iedere onderstelde inpassing van systemen op bepaalde
wijze in elkaar hetzij de beëindiging, hetzij de stuiting op onmogelijkheid kan worden
geconstrueerd. De vraag naar de geldigheid van het principium tertii exclusi is dus
aequivalent met de vraag naar de mogelijkheid van onoplosbare wiskundige problemen.
Voor de wel eens uitgesproken9 overtuiging, dat onoplosbare wiskundige problemen
niet bestaan, is geen aanwijzing van een bewijs aanwezig.
Zoolang alleen bepaalde eindige discrete systemen gesteld worden, is het onder-
zoek naar de mogelijkheid of onmogelijkheid eener inpassing steeds beëindigbaar en
voerend tot antwoord, is dus het principium tertii exclusi een betrouwbaar redeneer-
principe.10
Dat ook oneindige systemen ten opzichte van zoovele eigenschappen eindig wor-
den beheerscht, geschiedt door overzien van de aftelbaar oneindige reeks der ge-
heele ge|tallen met volledige inductie11, namelijk door opmerken van eigenschappen, 157
d.w.z. inpassingen, die voor een willekeurig geheel getal gelden, in het bijzonder ook
van contradicties, dat zijn onmogelijke inpassingen, die voor een willekeurig geheel
getal gelden. Dat echter uit de in een vraag gestelde systemen een is af te leiden, dat
door een invariant over een aftelbaar oneindige reeks de vraag volledig induceerend
leest, en zoo oplost, blijkt eerst a posteriori, als toevallig de constructie van zulk een
systeem gelukt is. Want het geheel der uit de vraagstelling te ontwikkelen systemen
is aftelbaar onaf 12, dus niet a priori methodisch te onderzoeken ten opzichte van
de aanwezigheid of afwezigheid van een de vraag beslissend systeem. En het is niet
uitgesloten, dat een even gelukkige greep, als zoo dikwijls de beslissing bracht, eens
het aftelbaar onaffe systeem der mogelijke ontwikkelingen tot een onoplosbaarheid
zou overzien.
Zoodat in oneindige systemen het principium tertii exclusi vooralsnog niet be-
trouwbaar is. Toch zal men bij ongerechtvaardigde toepassing nooit kunnen stuiten
9vgl. Hilbert. Mathematische Probleme. Göttinger Nachrichten. 1900. Ook Schoenflies (l.c.) wil
onvoorwaardelijk de methode van het indirecte bewijs handhaven, die hij ten onrechte uitsluitend
van het principium contradictionis afhankelijk acht.
10Dit onderzoek kan zelfs steeds door een machine worden uitgevoerd, of door een gedresseerd dier,
vereischt niet de oer-intuïtie der wiskunde, levend in een menschelijk intellect. Maar tegenover
vragen betreffende oneindige verzamelingen wordt die oer-intuïtie telkens weer onmisbaar; door dit
voorbij te zien, zijn Peano en Russell, Cantor en Bernstein slechts tot dwalingen gekomen.
11Poincaré is misschien de eenige, die in de volledige inductie ‘le raisonnement mathématique par
excellence’ heeft herkend. Vgl. La Science et l’Hypothese. Chap. I.
12vgl. Grondslagen der Wiskunde. p. 148.
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system a in a certain way into a system b, and being blocked by the impossibility of
that fitting, exclude one another.
Now the principium tertii exclusi : this demands that every supposition is either
correct or incorrect, mathematically: that of every supposed fitting in a certain way
of systems in one another, either the termination or the blockage by impossibility,
can be constructed. The question of the validity of the principium tertii exclusi is
thus equivalent to the question concerning the possibility of unsolvable mathemati-
cal problems. For the already proclaimed conviction that unsolvable mathematical
problems do not exist, no indication of a demonstration is present.9
As long as only certain finite discrete systems are posited, the investigation into
the possibility or impossibility of a fitting can always be terminated and leads to an
answer, whence the principium tertii exclusi is a reliable principle of reasoning.10
That also infinite systems, with respect to so many properties, are controlled by
finite means, is achieved by surveying the denumerably infinite sequence of the whole
numbers by complete induction,11 namely by observing properties, that is, fittings,
that hold for an arbitrary whole number, and in particular also contradictions, that
is, impossible fittings, that hold for an arbitrary whole number. However, that from
the systems posited in a question, one can be derived that reads the question by
means of a complete induction, on the basis of an invariant in a denumerably infinite
sequence, and thereby solves it, is found only a posteriori, when accidentally the
construction of such a system has succeeded. For the whole of the systems that can
be developed from the question posed is denumerably unfinished,12 whence cannot
be a priori investigated methodically regarding the presence or absence of a system
that decides the question. And it is not excluded, that by a draw as lucky as the
ones that have so often led to a decision, we will one day see from the denumerably
infinite system of possible developments that it is unsolvable.
So that in infinite systems the principium tertii exclusi is as yet not reliable. Still,
one can never, in unjustified application, be blocked by a contradiction and thereby
discover the groundlessness of one’s reasonings. After all, to that end it would have
9Cf. Hilbert (1900). Also Schoenflies (1908) wants to uphold the method of indirect proof uncondi-
tionally, which he mistakenly considers to depend only on the principium contradictionis.
10This investigation itself can always be done by a machine or by a trained animal, not requiring
the intuition of mathematics living in a human intellect. But in face of questions involving infinite
sets, that intuition becomes, again and again, indispensable; by overlooking this, Peano and Russell,
Cantor and Bernstein have only arrived at errors. [Brouwer gives an exposition of these errors in
the chapter 3 of his dissertation Brouwer 1907, ‘Wiskunde en Logica’.]
11Poincaré is perhaps the only one who has recognized mathematical induction as ‘le raisonnement
mathématique par excellence’. See Poincaré (1902, Chap. I).
12Cf. Brouwer (1907, p. 148).
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op een contradictie en zoo de ongegrondheid van zijn redeneeringen ontdekken. Im-
mers daartoe zouden de volvoering en de contradictoriteit van een inpassing beide
tegelijk contradictoor moeten kunnen zijn, wat het principium contradictionis niet
toelaat.
Een sprekend voorbeeld levert de volgende onbewezen stelling, die op grond van
het principium tertii exclusi in de gangbare theorie der transfinite getallen algemeen
vertrouwd en gebruikt wordt, dat n.l. elk getal is òf eindig òf oneindig, m.a.w. dat
voor elk getal γ kan worden geconstrueerd:
| hetzij een afbeelding van γ geheel op de rij der geheele getallen zóó, dat daarbij 158
een getal α uit die rij het laatste is (de getallen α+ 1, α + 2, α+ 3, . . . vrij blijven),
hetzij een afbeelding van γ geheel of gedeeltelijk op de rij der geheele getallen in
haar geheel.13
Zoolang deze stelling onbewezen is, moet men voor onzeker houden, of vragen als:
“Is bij de decimale ontwikkeling van π een cijfer, dat duurzaam veelvuldiger op-
treedt, dan alle andere? ”
“Komen bij de decimale ontwikkeling van π oneindig veel paren van gelijke opeen-
volgende cijfers voor? ”
een oplossing bezitten.
En evenzoo onzeker blijft, of de algemeenere wiskundige vraag:
“Is in de wiskunde het principium tertii exclusi onbepaald geldig? ”
een oplossing bezit.14
Samenvattende:
In wijsheid is geen logica.
In wetenschap is logica vaak, maar niet duurzaam doeltreffend.
In wiskunde is niet zeker, of alle logica geoorloofd is, en is niet zeker of is uit te
maken, of alle logica geoorloofd is.
13De eventueele onjuistheid dezer stelling zal weer nooit in een contradictie kunnen blijken; immers
de contradictoriteit van de constructie der vrij blijvende rij α+ 1, α+ 2, α+ 3 . . ., en die van haar
contradictoriteit kunnen nooit tezamen optreden.
14Men behoort dus in wiskunde de gewoonlijk als bewezen geldende stellingen te onderscheiden in
juiste en niet-contradictore. Tot de eerste behooren de algebraïsche en analytische gelijkheden, en
de geometrische snijpuntsstellingen; ook, dat een puntverzameling geen andere machtigheid bezitten
kan, dan de (Grondslagen, pag. 149) genoemde. Tot de laatste, dat een puntverzameling zeker een
dier machtigheden bezit; ook, dat een afgesloten puntverzameling zich laat splitsen in een perfekte
en een aftelbare.
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to be possible for the execution and contradictoriness of a fitting to be simultaneously
contradictory, which the principium contradictionis does not allow.
A striking example is provided by the following undemonstrated proposition, which
on the ground of the principium tertii exclusi is generally trusted and used in the
current theory of transfinite numbers, namely that every number is either finite or
infinite, in other words, that for every number γ one can construct:
either a mapping of all of γ to the sequence of the whole numbers, such that a
number α in that sequence is the last one (the numbers α+1, α+2, α+3, . . . remain
free),
or a mapping of all or part of γ to the sequence of the natural numbers in its
entirety.13
As long as this proposition is undemonstrated, it must be held uncertain whether
questions such as:
‘Is there in the decimal expansion of π a digit that occurs enduringly more often
than all others? ’
‘Do there occur in the decimal expansion of π infinitely many pairs of equal con-
secutive digits? ’
have a solution.
And likewise, it remains uncertain whether the more general mathematical ques-
tion:
‘Is in mathematics the principium tertii exclusi unconditionally valid? ’
has a solution.14
Summarizing:
In wisdom is no logic.
In science, logic is often, but not enduringly efficacious.
In mathematics it is not certain whether all logic is permissible, and it is not
certain whether it can be decided whether all logic is permissible.
13A latent incorrectness of this proposition also shall never become clear from a contradiction: after
all, the contradictoriness of the construction of the sequence α+ 1, α+ 2, α+ 3, . . . which remains
free and that of its contradictoriness can never occur together.
14One should therefore in mathematics distinguish the propositions that are usually taken to have
been demonstrated into correct and non-contradictory ones. To the former belong the algebraic and
analytic equalities, and the geometrical incidence theorems; also, that a point set can have no other
cardinality than those mentioned in Brouwer (1907, p. 149). To the latter, that a point set does
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